BB 4 - Gina vs. Bika

The Gemara understands that it is more likely that the custom will be to build a wall in regards to a גינה - a vegetable garden or fruit orchard - than a בקעה - a field meant to grow grains. The question is, Why?

נ"ל בע"ה that the understanding is that the whole reason that we would build a wall is to prevent מראית עין - the Evil eye. That being the case, it is more likely for someone to look jealously at a field that is immediately ready for consumption - the vegetable garden or fruit orchard - as opposed to a field of grains that require many steps of processing before the produce can be consumed.

Baba Basra 2-3 - damaging sight

(To prevent any 'mar'is ayin,' this post was posted in America, and while it is already Shabbos in Israel, it is not yet Shabbos in the US.)

The gemara introduces us to the concept of hezek re'iyah. At the simplest level, this means that it is possible to cause damage to another with one's vision. The question is, What is the damage that is being discussed here?

I understood that there are at least two different types of damage spoken of here. One is that there is a damage that can be caused by simply looking with an 'ayin hara' - evil eye - at someone elses property. Another understanding is that there is a damage that is caused when a person can not go about his private affairs because I have visual access to his domain.

It is significant that the Gemara, as it continues onto daf gimel, gives two different assumptions as to whether or not the responsibility for preventing this type of damage is upon the neighbor who 'sees' or it is upon the one who is being looked at. The first assumption of the Gemara is that 'hezek re'iyah lav shmei hezek' - damaging sight is not considered a damage. This would mean that the 'offender' who is seeing is not the problem, but rather it is the problem of the one being seen. The question is, Why? The second section of the gemara assumes the opposite, that in fact this type of damaging sight is indeed a significant damage and is the responsibility of the one who is looking. Again, the question is, Why?

If we try to understand more deeply the two different explanations we gave earlier, we will see that the difference between them will indeed be upon whom the responsibility will be placed.

If we understand that the damage here is based on the concept of ayin hara - evil eye - then we need to understand what is an evil eye? The concept of the evil eye is that if someone (we will call him Reuven) looks jealously at another's property (we will call him Shimon), it brings about a question in the heavenly court as to whether or not the one who owns it really deserves it. Thus they look at the records for Shimon and if he is indeed unworthy, he may lose it because of Reuven's negative look.

Of course, this begs for explanation. Why should Reuven lose something because of Shimon's bad thoughts? If anything, we should judge Reuven the negative thinker, not Shimon! The answer is that there is a responsibility on Shimon to be tzanuah - to be modest and not show off the good things that he has. The negative thought that Reuven has is a result of Shimon's showy way of life, and thus, Shimon is judged, for his lack of modesty has brought about a negative thought on the part of Reuven.

Once we understand this, we can understand why hezek re'iyah is not considered the responsibility of the one who is looking. It is the problem of the one who is being looked at! Therefore, he is the one who must build a wall to protect himself.

In the other understanding, however, the damage that is being caused is because the one who is being looked at (again Shimon) can not go about his private affairs because there is someone (again Reuven) 'intruding' with his gaze. This limitation is solely the responsibility of the gazer, and thus we would say the concept that hezek re'iyah is indeed considered a damage, and the responsibility is upon the gazer to prevent himself from damaging and to therefore build a wall.

BAM 27 - Returning only a Jew's lost objects

How do we understand the fact that the Torah only obligates us to return the lost object of a Jew?

Another place we have this question is in regard to the prohibition of taking interest on a loan, which is only forbidden when lending to a Jew, but not to a non-Jew. The question is, Why?

נראה לי בע"ה that the reason is as follows. (I believe the following is based on the Chofetz Chaim in Ahavas Chessed.) If we think about it, it really makes sense that one should charge interest to someone who is borrowing money. After all, they are receiving a benefit from my money, perhaps investing it in a lucrative business, while I sit at home without the money myself. There is certainly a monetary value to that, which I should be able to charge. Similarly, if someone loses an object, it should rightfully belong to the person who has found it, and not the one who lost it - as my 11th grade rebbe, Rav Yehoshua Kalish used to say, possession is ten-tenths of the law. If you have it, it's yours. If you lose it, it's gone!

The Torah, however, tells us a tremendous חידוש. This is that every Jew is considered your brother. A sibling identifies with his brother and would give him back an object he lost, despite the fact that he has every right to keep it. Similarly, a person who loves his brother would never charge him interest on a loan, but do it as a favor, completely altruistically. Hashem expects us to view every other Jew as our brother. This is a special relationship that Hashem desires to exist between the members of His chosen nation. These requirements are extra and beyond what is naturally called for. This is why they only apply to one's fellow Jew, and not to a non-Jew.

BAM 21 - Figs, olives, and carob

The Gemara says that when a fig falls it gets disgusting, and therefore the owner will give up hope on it. However, the indication is that this would not be true in regards to olives and carob. What's the difference between them?

So, living in Eretz Yisrael, I am fortunate, בע"ה to have an olive tree in my backyard, and carob trees running along my street, so experience shows that olives and carob are both the types of fruit that are quite hard when they fall off the tree. That being the case, it is unlikely that they will get ruined when they fall. Figs, on the other hand, will fall off the tree when they are soft and ripe, and thus become easily ruined.

BAM 21 - What is Ye'ush?

Normally we think of Ye'ush as a person giving up hope on his object. This understanding leads us to a very significant problem. How can we have a "Ye'ush shelo mida'as" - a 'giving up hope' without knowing? If Ye'ush involves an active thought on the part of the owner of the object, we would have an oxymoron.

נראה לי בע"ה that Ye'ush actually means a dissociation between an owner and his object. But I believe there are two levels of dissociation. One is as regards the object itself (חפצא), and one is in regards to how the owner himself views the object (גברא). When we talk about the dissociation from the view of the object (so to speak), we refer to it as Ye'ush. When we talk about the disconnection from the view of the owner, we talk about his da'as.

When we have both factors together, the halacha is clear cut. If it has no sign, we have the dissociation from the object's 'perspective' (ye'ush). If we also have his awareness (da'as) that he has lost it, he gives up hope and the object completely leaves his possession. It would then be permitted to keep it. On the other hand, if it has a sign, it remains attached to him (no Ye'ush), and when he realizes he lost it, he does not give up hope (his da'as is to keep it), so it must be returned.

Ye'ush shelo mida'as is where we have one dissociating factor, from the perspective of the object - it is lost and has no sign. But the second dissociating factor, which is the owner's awareness of his loss, is missing.

According to Abaye, this object is not disconnected completely from its owner, and therefore it would be forbidden to take it. According to Rava, the fact that we know he will dissociate from it as soon as he finds out gives us the liberty to say that there is already a complete disconnection even now, since we already have a disconnection from the perspective of the object itself.

BAM 19 - Life after death

The Gemara hides an incredibly deep concept in some seemingly simple words that we could easily gloss over and understand simply at the surface level. The Gemara states that a healthy person who wishes to give someone else a gift that should take effect after his death must say that it is transferred 'from today until after my death.' Only with this declaration is it considered similar to the regular statement of a deathly ill person. Such a sickly individual need only state that something should be given to another party and the gift takes effect fully after his death.

Hidden here is a great depth. The reason the deathly ill person need only make a simple statement, and it is transferred post mortem, is because there is intense power in his words. Why is there such power in his command? The answer lies in what the healthy person must say in order for his statement to take effect in a similar way. He must say, 'from today until after my death.' There is a recognition that is automatic for a deathly ill person that takes greater effort for the healthy individual. That is, that what I do now has an affect after my death! This is a natural understanding for someone who is deathly ill. This understanding is what gives power to his statement to take effect.

This is a tremendous lesson - the effect of our actions and words is increased manifold by our recognition of its effects on the world, at every level of reality - from the spiritual to the physical. Many times we do not realize the power of our words until it is too late. After 120, Hashem reveals it to us, as the Nefesh Hachaim explains the passuk מגיד לאדם מה שיחו - that Hashem reveals to a person the true effects of his speech; after his death.

For the deathly ill person, he sees it more and more clearly as he nears that final revelation. That is why his words have such power. A healthy person can also tap into that power if he recognizes the effect of his words - 'מהיום ולאחר מיתה' - 'from today until after my death.'

BAM 8 - Acquiring together

Rami bar Chama draws an inference from the Mishna's statement that when two people pick up a lost object together, they both acquire it. From this we see that each one intended to acquire it not just for himself, but also for the other person who is picking it up with him.

The question is, what is the inference? Perhaps they are both picking up each half only for themselves, and they each acquire the part that they have picked up, by the power of their own act of acquisition?

נ"ל בע"ה that if they indeed had the intention to acquire the object only for themselves, that would mean that they were each only trying to acquire the entire object. Thus, being that they picked it up together, neither of them would have acquired it, because if two people try to completely acquire the same thing at the same time, their acts cancel each other out, and it remains ownerless.

Therefore, if we say that they have both acquired half of it, it must be that they were acquiring it in a way that each would have half. The intent of each is necessary on behalf of the other party, otherwise their selfish intent would block each other's acquisition attempt. Thus, we see that each one is helping the other acquire his half, and therefore Rami bar Chama proves that a person has the ability to acquire something for someone else.

This answer, however, requires further thought, because if it is correct, then it should not be necessary to have active thoughts to help the other party acquire, rather it should be enough for him to passively permit the other party to acquire his side.

On further thought, however, we already have seen that when they split up the object, it is not per se split based on exactly which side or which part is being held, but rather, it can be split in alternative ways (e.g. the talis with gold). Clearly, each person is helping the other party to acquire the garment in its entirety, albeit as a partner. This is the function that allows each party to request an alternate splitting up of the garment (or object).

It therefore becomes clear that each party is helping the other to acquire the entire object as a partner, and this can only be done through זכייה - actually acquiring it for the other party. This is Rami bar Chama's proof.

BAM 2 - Seeing and acquiring

The Gemara begins with an assumption that the two cases of 'finding' and 'all mine' are one. Based on this, the Gemara learns that even though 'finding' could have the connotation of just seeing an object, the extra part of the case, 'all mine,' teaches that it is not enough to see an ownerless object for it to be considered yours, rather one must actually pick it up.

Then the Gemara rejects the notion that this is one case and says it is actually two separate cases, one referring to a lost object, and one referring to two people claiming they have bought something.

With this new understanding of the two cases as indeed being separate, do we lose the whole previous thought that taught us that seeing is not enough to acquire? In other words, will it now be enough to look at an object in order to acquire it, being that we don't have any extra case in the Mishna to teach us otherwise?

So I asked the local Rosh Kollel, R' Akiva Teichtal, who gives a daily daf shiur, and he said that they asked the same question in the shiur, and they came out as follows. It is clear that the Torah uses the word מצא - 'finding' to mean actually picking up. Thus, the Torah itself indicates that there is no acquisition until the object is picked up. At the first stage of the Gemara, all we were saying was that the mishna is coming to teach you this - so you don't make a mistake - and think that seeing it would be enough for it to be yours. Even without the mishna coming to tell us this, however, seeing would still not constitute an acquisition, thus when we no longer have the extra words from our mishna, we just don't have the indicator to correct our mistake; but seeing would still not create an acquisition in any event.

BK 96 - Old coins

The Gemara says that in regards to a case where someone stole a new coin, and it got old and turned black while in the posession of the thief, it is considered a significant change and the thief does not return the coin as is, but rather pays the original value of the coin when it was new.

The Gemara says that perhaps you would say that it is not a significant change, because it could be shined again and look new. To this the Gemara says, "מידע ידיע שיחמייהו" - Their age (or blackness) is known.

What does this mean?

בע"ה נ"ל לפרש that when you take an old blackened coin and shine it to look 'new,' no matter how much you shine it, it will still be obvious that this is not a new coin, but rather an old coin that was shined. That being the case, the value of a newly minted coin (in 'mint' condition) is higher than an old and dirty coin, and also higher than an old coin that has been shined to remove the effects of age. Thus, the 'age is known' - i.e. it is clear that it is still an old coin, despite the fact that it has been shined, and therefore one would have to pay the original value of what he stole and would not be able to give back the coin as is.

BK 92 - asking forgiveness

The Mishna says that one is not forgiven for the damage he has caused until he asks forgiveness from the one he caused damage to. This is proven from the passuk that states that Hashem commanded Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham.

The question is, we don't seem to see anywhere in the verse that Hashem is telling Avimelech to ask for forgiveness, nor does it say that he asked for Avraham to pardon him, so what's the proof?

ונ"ל בע"ה that Hashem tells Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham, and then says that Avraham will daven for Avimelech. The only way that Avraham would daven for him would be if Avraham feels positively toward him. Normally, when one causes an ill effect to his comrade, the compensation for the bad deed is not enough to placate him. Only once the person who has wronged his friend acknowledges his misdeed will the relationship return to its previous state. Thus the implication is that Avimelech is to get back on good terms with Avraham so they will be at the point where Avraham will daven for him.

This would also seem to be the understanding of the second passuk brought, where Avraham indeed davens for Avimelech. Here again we could ask how this proves that Avraham forgave Avimelech and therefore proves that one who has been damaged would also have an obligation to forgive the one who caused the damage? The answer be'H would be as we said, that from the fact that we see that Avraham davened, and he did so in such a way that indeed his tefilos were answered, this shows that he prayed in a fashion that was absolutely sincere and complete. This would only be possible if Avraham had completely forgiven Avimelech for his wrongdoing.

BK 88 - Brotherhood

The Mishna (87a) says that according to R' Yehuda, we do not apply the damage of embarrassment to a slave. The gemara explains that this is because the Torah uses the word "אחיו"- his brother, in reference to the one getting embarrassed.

Rashi explains that since a non-Jewish slave can not marry a Jew, he is not called your brother.

This would seem to indicate that one can only be called your brother if he can marry your sister and become your brother-in-law.

The mesoras hashas has a second explanation from Rashi, and that is that the non-Jewish slave doesn't have brotherhood at all, even with his own kin, as we find he would be able to marry his own sister or his brother's ex-wife.

Interestingly, the difference between the first and second understanding of Rashi is that in the first explanation, he doesn't have brotherhood with Jews. In the second explanation, he doesn't have brotherhood with anyone.

Something that needs explanation is that according to the second understanding of Rashi, that he doesn't have brotherhood at all, where is there an indication from the passuk that this is what brotherhood means? If anything, the verse says that the damage was caused in an altercation between "איש ואחיו" - a man and his brother. This would seem to imply that there is a brotherhood that is necessary (and missing by a slave) between the Jew who attacked and his 'brother' that was embarrassed. Where is the implication that the person attacked must intrinsically have 'brotherhood,' thus implying an exclusion of the slave, who has no brotherhood at all, even with his own kin?

It seems that according to the second understanding, we are not learning out from the relationship implied by "איש ואחיו" - a man and his brother, but rather, simply from the fact that the person who was attacked was referred to as a 'brother,' as opposed to, say, a 'fellow' (עמיתו) or another similar term.

It is also interesting that according to the mesoras hashas, this second understanding was the one Rashi preferred. Perhaps he preferred it because the Gemara, when stating the drasha, does not say, "to the exclusion of one who has no brotherhood with him (ie the one who attacked him)," but rather the Gemara says, "to the exclusion of one who has no brotherhood," without mentioning the one who attacked. This seems to be implying that he intrinsically has no brotherhood, even with his own sister and brother.

It is notable that Tosfos says, in explanation of Rashi's second understanding, that we are speaking about the slave's children, that they do not have brotherhood with their siblings. This is actually indicated from Rashi himself, when he says that the source for this idea that a slave would be permitted to marry his sister is from the verse that compares a slave to a donkey. This comparison teaches us that a slave's child is like a donkey, whose offspring may be mated with one another.

This is an important point, because this verse specifically applies to a slave, and not to a regular non-Jew, who, it would seem, would not be permitted to marry his sister. The slave himself would also be like a regular non-Jew, forbidden to marry his sister, as he was the product of a relationship between non-slaves. Only a child born of a slave would be considered like the child of a donkey and not related to his siblings.

BK 86 - payment for impermanent damage

The Gemara brings the argument between Rava and Abaye as to the obligation where one has caused an impermanent damage. Abaye says the damager pays 'sheves gedolah,' the value of the hand, and 'sheves ketana,' the loss of work as a cabbage patch guard. Rava says there is no payment for the hand, rather he is paid for his loss of work, but his work as a regular full-fledged worker.

I was wondering why according to Abaye one would have to pay for the hand if it is going to return to full usage later. I realized that the payment will be the difference between what he was worth before the damage, and what he would be worth now if he was sold as a slave. If he was currently sold, the person buying would be aware that his new slave's hand would be returning to full use soon, so the market value of the one damaged has not gone down as much as if he had lost the use of his hand completely.

It is also important to note that both according to Rava and Abaye, the value of the hand is being paid for, however, it is really just a question of how we look at the temporary devaluation - as נזק - the regular damage, and therefore we look at the slave value (Abaye); or as שבת - the loss of work, and therefore we look at his full loss of work (Rava).

BK 84 - midgets killing giants

It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the piece of R' Dustai ben Yehuda (on 83b), when we talk about different sizes (a small eye and a big eye), the Gemara says that if the one who knocked out the victim's eye had a smaller eye than his victim, we would lack a fulfillment of "an eye for an eye" if we would knock out the assailant's eye. Only when we speak of the possibility of one person paying (ie where the assailant's and the victim's eyes are different sizes) and another person having his eye knocked out (if their eyes are the same size) do we bring the passuk that has to do with "one law shall be for all."

When the Gemara later brings the contrasting cases of a midget killing a giant and a giant killing a midget, one would have expected the Gemara to bring the passuk of "a soul for a soul" which indicates that the person being killed must be the same size as the one he himself killed. Instead we bring the verse of "one law shall be for all."

There are two possible explanations that come to mind.

One is that the Gemara is assuming that you know the back and forth that was just stated, and it is almost like a חסורי מחסרא that you can add in, "if they are different size people than perhaps we would pay value in such a case. But then we would have the problem of 'one law shall be for all...'"

Another possibility is that the Gemara is trying to show that we are not focusing in on the thing that was superficially lost (the body or the eye), rather the function of that thing (life/sight). We could not bring the verse נפש תחת נפש - "a soul for a soul" because at this point we are coming to prove our point by exclusion, and that verse actually implies our point directly, that we focus not on the body, but rather the soul. This second explanation, however, could be easily refuted because the word נפש, while traditionally translated as 'soul' is really referring to the animal soul, and more directly indicates the body itself, not only its life force per se.

ונראה יותר כפשט הראשון

I think it also interesting to note that in the הוה אמינא of the Gemara we would have thought to say that we don't focus on the loss of vision (in the case of the eye) or the loss of life (in the case of murder), but rather on the eye itself or the body itself. Why would we think such a thing? I think that it is a very fair assumption because the Torah is מחדש that all you are paying is the actual value as a slave, not the intrinsic value of the eye or the life (which would seem to anyway be priceless). Thus perhaps we would think that we should be very 'superficial' as it were, and make a distinction between different size bodies and eyes. The חידוש is that we do not look at it so superficially, rather we look at the eye for its function, which is sight, and the body for its function, which is life.

BK 78 - Tana responding for an Amora?

The Gemara wants to understand where Rava's statement that "the word שה comes to exclude a crossbred animal" applies, and first says that his statement was made in regards to redeeming the donkey, whose holiness can not be transferred onto a crossbreed. The Gemara then asks that according to R' Elazar who says that one can use a crosbred animal for this function, where would Rava's statement apply? To this we say, "R' Elazar would answer that Rava would apply in a case of a Kosher animal giving birth to an unkosher animal."

Question is, why is R' Elazar, who is a Tana and predates Rava, forced to explain Rava? If anything, Rava should have to explain himself according to R' Elazar!

My guess would be that Rava was not saying this statement on his own, but rather, was quoting an ancient tradition that predated the Tannaim. The Gemara here itself seems to be assuming that indeed Rava's statement was powerful enough to warrant extensive discussion as to where it applies. The fact that R' Elazar has to reckon with Rava's statement strongly indicates that it was an old enough statement that R' Elazar too should have known of it, and therefore the Gemara has R' Elazar answering 'according to Rava.'

בכל מקרה, צריך עיון יותר ומקור לכזה פשט

Shiurim

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BK 76 - when did you slaughter?

The Gemara on 76B seems to be saying (in R' Elazar's question) that the slaughtering that creates an obligation to pay four or five times must be one that permits the animal to be eaten. If there is some other factor that is missing, for example the sprinkling of the blood (according to R' Yochanan) or the redemption of the animal (according to Resh Lakish), then the slaughtering has not permitted on its own and would not create an obligation to pay four or five times.

Question is, Why do we care if the slaughtering permits it to be eaten on its own?

נראה לי בס"ד that the reason the Torah obligates one to pay four or five times when he slaughters the animal or sells it is because he has done something to create a greater benefit for himself, what we might call מקרב הנאתה. When he slaughters it, he now benefits directly because he can actually eat it. Before he slaughtered it, he could not directly benefit. Similarly, when he sells the animal, he has gotten money for it, which he can now directly use for his own benefit.

With that introduction, the explanation of R' Elazar's implication becomes clear. If the slaughtering alone does not create the ability for the animal to be eaten, because another factor is missing (i.e. sprinkling or redeeming), then that act of slaughtering has not brought about a direct benefit to the thief. This in turn means that he would not be fined the extra two or three times because he is still missing the ability to be able to directly benefit from the animal he has slaughtered.

BK 76 - "Selling" to Hekdesh

The Gemara distinguishes between selling to a regular person and the donation one gives to the Temple of a sacrifice as follows. When one sells to a regular person, it is no longer referred to as the original owner's animal, rather the new owner's animal. However, in regards to a sacrifice, it is still referred to as the sacrifice of the original owner, despite the fact that it now belongs to the temple. Therefore, when one promises to bring an animal as a sacrifice, it is not considered that he has 'sold' it, and he will not have the obligation to pay four or five times.

The question is, who cares about the semantics? If the Torah requires one to pay four or five times if he has sold it, and that means that he has transferred it into another domain, what is the difference if it is still referred to as the original owner's animal? למעשה, it is now in the possession of the Temple!

It seems clear that we are not just dealing here with an issue of semantics, but rather, the very fact that it is referred to as the animal of this person shows that there is still a relationship between the person and the animal, despite his having donated it to the Temple.

The truth is that there is an ownership that he retains completely, despite his having donated this animal. That is, that he still retains the exclusive right to use this animal for the purposes of his own sacrifice. If, let's say, he has an obligation to bring a korban Olah, this animal is still his in regards to fulfilling his commitment, and no one else may use it. It is referred to as "Reuven's olah" (as per Rashi).

Thus, the character of one's transfer in regards to hekdesh is completely different from the character of one's transfer when one sells an item. Making an animal hekdesh just means that the owner will use it for a specific use which involves the Temple and the holiness that applies to the animal because of that. The animal is still connected to that person. Selling an animal to someone means that it completely leaves the ownership of the person who is selling it. Only then would the one who stole it have to pay the four or five times.

(Important to note, as Rashi mentioned, that despite the fact that it still belongs in a certain sense to the one who has donated it to the Temple, in another sense it has been transferred out of the domain of the original owner insofar as the slaughtering that the thief does is not considered as if it was done to the original owner's animal. It requires further thought to determine if the animal that the thief has donated is now called his sacrifice. The indication from the gemara is that indeed it would be called that.)

BK 75 - admitting to the fine

The Gemara says that Rav could even work out in R' Elazar B'r Shimon - despite the fact that ordinarily Rav holds that if one admits to the fine he won't have to pay it, where he's admitting because of the approaching witnesses, he will still have to pay the fine.

This needs explanation! Why should it matter what his motivation is? If the Torah says one is exempt when he admits, and as Rav says, this applies even where witnesses later arrive, what do we care why he's admitting?

In order to understand this, we need to think about why the Torah does not require one to pay a fine if he admits he has done the act that ordinarily requires payment for the fine. The simple understanding is that the Torah uses the fine as a teaching tool to help one realize the crookedness of his ways. The greater that evil act, the greater the fine - the greater this person needs to get a 'potch' to realize his mistake. Thus if he only steals, he only pays double. If he goes so far as to slaughter the animal or sell it, he must pay four or five times.

The reason the Torah says that if he admits to the act he's done he does not have to pay is because he has shown that he understands the mistake he has made. Thus, we no longer need to 'teach him a lesson.' (Parenthetically, this explanation works for Rav, but according to Shmuel, we will need to understand why if he has admitted, we will still give him the fine when witnesses come along without his knowledge.)

With this background, we can understand why Rav would concede that if he admits when he sees witnesses coming, he will still pay the fine. He is only exempt from the fine when we see he has learned the lesson and has admitted on his own. When he admits because the witnesses are coming, he is just trying to get out of having to pay the fine, not because he has learned his lesson! Thus we require him to pay, despite his admission, so his pocket will hurt and he will learn that crime does not pay.

BK 62 - Watching haystacks

What does Rashi mean (ד"ה חטין וחיפן בשעורים) when he says that when a person is supposed to protect a haystack, and it seems to be made of barley, that he will not watch it well?

One possiblity is that barley does not get burned as easily, thus it requires less carefullness.

Another possibility is that since the barley is not as significant, it does not give the same impetus to the one who is supposed to watch it to take care of it properly.

ונראה לי פשט שני

In either pshat, if he would have known there was wheat to be watched there, he would have taken better care not to create this destruction through his fire.

Baba Kama 60 & 61 - shiurim

Baba Kama 61 (19:04)
Baba Kama 60 (23:19)

BK 61 - Water obviating fire's responsibility

What is the pshat in the statement of the gemara that according to the one who says that the river we are talking about here is an irrigation ditch, it has to have water in it?

The hint is in Tosfos where he says that according to the one who says we are talking about a literal river, there will be an exemption even if there is no water in the river because it is deep. So despite the fact that it is not as wide as the public area, it is less likely the fire will pass over that wadi.

The irrigation ditch we are talking about is only one cubit deep, as Rashi told us earlier - this is the reason it is called an אמת המים. Thus, the depth doesn't help us, and the prevention must be because of the water itself.

BK 61 - Sacrificing for Torah

The gemara says that according to the one who says Dovid's question had to do with paying for something that was damaged by fire and was hidden, we need to understand what it means that "Dovid did not drink the waters." This would seem to imply that he did not do as was told to him through these messengers who had asked the question to the Sanhedrin! The gemara explains that he certainly did as he was told, but he did not say the halacha over in the name of those who risked their lives to receive this answer, as he had learned from Shmuel hanavi.

In searching for a pshat in this, I came across a very interesting site in Hebrew that speaks about this. There he says that we find that it is actually a good thing for someone to 'kill himself' for the Torah, so why does he not have it said in his name? The way I understand the answer, the understanding of it is that when a person totally negates himself - "kills himself" - for the Torah, so in essence he shows that it is not important to him that his own name be mentioned in connection to the Torah he is teaching. It is actually much greater than that, because now the concept is said over in the name of 'the Gemara' - meaning, it is said over as if it is a halacha l'Moshe mi'Sinai. Thus the person has brought down and restored the Torah to its former glory. Can there be any greater reward for one who 'kills himself' over the Torah?

BK 60 - Punishing the righteous

The Gemara says that difficulties come to the world because of evil people, yet the first people to be punished are the righteous. This needs explanation.

My first thought is that the evil people of the world are so lost that they are not even aware of the fact that they are doing evil. They have justified their ways for such a long time that they view themselves to be perfect. The righteous know the truth, and therefore when Hashem sends His warnings of impending difficulties, it is for those that know there is a message to take heed. When the great ones do not notice as well, their sin is much more severe, because they are the ones privy to the truth. Thus they are punished first.

BK 58 & 59 shiurim

Baba Kama 58 - running time 19:39
Baba Kama 59 - running time 20:57

BK 59 - Damage times sixty

The gemara says we paskin like Rav Papa and Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua. It is unclear whether we are paskin like the first version where they did like Rav Nachman or like the second version where they did not. It is also unclear which version of the sixty times we do (as per the machlokes amoraim on 58B)

The Nimukei Yosef rounds up these two issues, saying that we paskin like the first version where they did like Rav Nachman said, and the way we determine the damage is by taking sixty similar date palms and seeing how significant the devaluation of this one is from that perspective.

As an aside, it is interesting to note that we take a multiplicative factor of sixty, in effect nullifying the damage (בטל בששים)! This needs explanation.

BK 58 - Preventing damage

The classic case of preventing damage (מבריח ארי) is where Reuven sees a lion headed toward Shimon's flock. Reuven chases away the lion to prevent the damage it would cause to Shimon. There is no monetary value to this action of Reuven, despite the fact that he has saved Shimon a tremendous amount.

The case under discussion in our gemara is where Reuven has a field that Shimon's animal accidentally trespasses upon. The field is quite muddy, and Shimon's animal is in danger of being damaged in the mud. Reuven unwittingly helps out Shimon's animal when the animal tramples on some wheat stalks. While this trampling saves Shimon's animal from damage, it simultaneously causes the wheat stalks to be destroyed. There is a value in this case to the damage that Reuven has unwittingly prevented. Shimon must pay Reuven for this benefit.

The Gemara says that our case is different than the aforementioned one for two possible reasons. One is that in the former case, Reuven was fully aware that he was saving Shimon from damage, which is not so in our case. The second reason is that in the former case there was no loss of money when he chased away the lion, which is not so in our case, where the prevention of damage to the animal inflicted damage on the wheat stalks.

The first distinction needs explanation, because of what significance is it if the person is aware? Just because he knows he is saving the other person's property, would it be as if he is relinquishing his claim to monetary compensation? If we would say that the issue is that when he knows, so he accepts upon himself any damages, then what is the difference between the first and second answers? The gemara seems to indicate that they are independant (from the language אי נמי)!

A careful reading of Tosfos answers this question.

Tosfos explains that the first answer is assuming that מבריח ארי is only when the savior is aware he is preventing damage, and thus he implicitly relinquishes his claim to monetary compensation, even if he loses money on the way. In our case, however, he is not aware, and thus there is no implicit relinquishing of the compensatin for loss.

The second explanation of the Gemara assumes that when a person is not intentionally preventing damage, it would also be called מבריח ארי. Thus, Reuven would only be left without compensation in a case where there is no damage to himself. If he is unaware, and there is indeed damage, so there would be an obligation to pay the damage, as in the case of our gemara.

So it comes out that the two answers are simultaneously independent and interdependent; the main focus of the first answer is the aspect of awareness, and the main focus of the second answer is the damage, but both include the other factor as well, just in a different light.

BK 57 - shiur

Here is Baba Kama daf נ"ז.

Running time is 20:38

BK 57 - Returning an object without the owner's knowledge

The gemara says that in regards to a thief or a guardian who returns an object, there must be an awareness on the part of the owner that his object has been returned. If he does not know, then the responsibility remains upon the thief or guardian if anything occurs to the object before the owner is indeed aware of its return.

This is not true, says the gemara, in regards to a lost object that is being returned. As long as it is returned to the domain of its owner, the owner need not be aware of it. The gemara proves this from the passuk השב תשיבם - the double language of returning teaches that one must even return the object many times.

The question is, what does one thing have to do with the other? How do we see from the fact that I must return it many times that I have less of a responsibility and even if the owner is unaware that his object has been returned I am no longer held accountable if anything happens?

Perhaps it could be explained, לע"ד, that when the Torah says השב תשיבם - that there is an obligation to return a lost object even multiple times - it is basically saying that even if the person who lost his animal has been irresponsible and not properly watched it on more than one occasion, the person who finds it would still have to return it over and over again. This basically means that the Torah does not focus on the irresponsibility of the person who has lost the object - as far as the Torah is concerned he is not careful and we don't care! If you found it, you must still return it, despite the owner's carelessnes, even a hundred times!

From the Torah's view of the owner of the lost object, it is clear that his awareness of his object is not so significant in relationship to his responsibility for his own object. That being the case, there are two ramifications - 1. The one who finds it must return it multiple times, and 2. If it is returned to the (well-guarded) domain of its owner, he need not even be aware of it!

על דרך המוסר, what also comes out of this, is that if someone sees an object that is lost lying on the ground, even if one would tell himself that the owner will probably never claim it, one should still pick it up. The reason would be that even if the person doesn't claim it, the obligation of the Torah to return an object is clearly not focused on the person who lost the object - rather on the person who has found the object! This is evident from the obligation to return the object multiple times - despite the owner's negligence!

BK 56

Here is the shiur on Baba Kama 56.

Running time: 20:42

Daf shiur: Baba Kama 55

Here is the Daf shiur from Shabbos's daf, Baba Kama 55.

Running time is exactly 22 minutes.

You can find older dapim on http://www.arigoldwag.com/dailydaf.html.

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Baba Kama 55: Amoraim don't know psukim?!

Why did Rebbe Chiya bar Abba imply that he doesn't know the psukim of the Aseres Hadibros? Could it be that an Amora didn't know whether it said the word ייטב in the Second Luchos?!

Check Tosfos in Baba Basra 113A (referenced by רע"א and the Mesoras Hashas) who says that indeed they didn't!

Check the Maharatz Chiyas who says that of course he knew the psukim, but since we find that the first and second Dibros were said at the same time (שמור וזכור בדיבור אחד), therefore he didn't know if we could really talk about one being first and one being second.

Check the Ben Yehoyada, who also talks about it.

I was thinking (לע"ד) that perhaps we could say that of course Rebbe Chiya knew the psukim, but he just wasn't sure if it was the type of extra word one could make a drasha from. דיקא נמי from the fact that he sends Rebbe Chanina to Rebbe Tanchum who was an expert in אגדה. He doesn't say go to an expert in מקרא, rather an expert in אגדה - someone who knows how to darshan!

Check also the Maharsha who clearly does not take the statement literally.