Baba Kama 61 (19:04)
Baba Kama 60 (23:19)
Vayeshev - Moshiach Unfolds Quickly
2 days ago
Friday, February 27, 2009
BK 61 - Water obviating fire's responsibility
What is the pshat in the statement of the gemara that according to the one who says that the river we are talking about here is an irrigation ditch, it has to have water in it?
The hint is in Tosfos where he says that according to the one who says we are talking about a literal river, there will be an exemption even if there is no water in the river because it is deep. So despite the fact that it is not as wide as the public area, it is less likely the fire will pass over that wadi.
The irrigation ditch we are talking about is only one cubit deep, as Rashi told us earlier - this is the reason it is called an אמת המים. Thus, the depth doesn't help us, and the prevention must be because of the water itself.
The hint is in Tosfos where he says that according to the one who says we are talking about a literal river, there will be an exemption even if there is no water in the river because it is deep. So despite the fact that it is not as wide as the public area, it is less likely the fire will pass over that wadi.
The irrigation ditch we are talking about is only one cubit deep, as Rashi told us earlier - this is the reason it is called an אמת המים. Thus, the depth doesn't help us, and the prevention must be because of the water itself.
BK 61 - Sacrificing for Torah
The gemara says that according to the one who says Dovid's question had to do with paying for something that was damaged by fire and was hidden, we need to understand what it means that "Dovid did not drink the waters." This would seem to imply that he did not do as was told to him through these messengers who had asked the question to the Sanhedrin! The gemara explains that he certainly did as he was told, but he did not say the halacha over in the name of those who risked their lives to receive this answer, as he had learned from Shmuel hanavi.
In searching for a pshat in this, I came across a very interesting site in Hebrew that speaks about this. There he says that we find that it is actually a good thing for someone to 'kill himself' for the Torah, so why does he not have it said in his name? The way I understand the answer, the understanding of it is that when a person totally negates himself - "kills himself" - for the Torah, so in essence he shows that it is not important to him that his own name be mentioned in connection to the Torah he is teaching. It is actually much greater than that, because now the concept is said over in the name of 'the Gemara' - meaning, it is said over as if it is a halacha l'Moshe mi'Sinai. Thus the person has brought down and restored the Torah to its former glory. Can there be any greater reward for one who 'kills himself' over the Torah?
In searching for a pshat in this, I came across a very interesting site in Hebrew that speaks about this. There he says that we find that it is actually a good thing for someone to 'kill himself' for the Torah, so why does he not have it said in his name? The way I understand the answer, the understanding of it is that when a person totally negates himself - "kills himself" - for the Torah, so in essence he shows that it is not important to him that his own name be mentioned in connection to the Torah he is teaching. It is actually much greater than that, because now the concept is said over in the name of 'the Gemara' - meaning, it is said over as if it is a halacha l'Moshe mi'Sinai. Thus the person has brought down and restored the Torah to its former glory. Can there be any greater reward for one who 'kills himself' over the Torah?
Thursday, February 26, 2009
BK 60 - Punishing the righteous
The Gemara says that difficulties come to the world because of evil people, yet the first people to be punished are the righteous. This needs explanation.
My first thought is that the evil people of the world are so lost that they are not even aware of the fact that they are doing evil. They have justified their ways for such a long time that they view themselves to be perfect. The righteous know the truth, and therefore when Hashem sends His warnings of impending difficulties, it is for those that know there is a message to take heed. When the great ones do not notice as well, their sin is much more severe, because they are the ones privy to the truth. Thus they are punished first.
My first thought is that the evil people of the world are so lost that they are not even aware of the fact that they are doing evil. They have justified their ways for such a long time that they view themselves to be perfect. The righteous know the truth, and therefore when Hashem sends His warnings of impending difficulties, it is for those that know there is a message to take heed. When the great ones do not notice as well, their sin is much more severe, because they are the ones privy to the truth. Thus they are punished first.
BK 59 - Damage times sixty
The gemara says we paskin like Rav Papa and Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua. It is unclear whether we are paskin like the first version where they did like Rav Nachman or like the second version where they did not. It is also unclear which version of the sixty times we do (as per the machlokes amoraim on 58B)
The Nimukei Yosef rounds up these two issues, saying that we paskin like the first version where they did like Rav Nachman said, and the way we determine the damage is by taking sixty similar date palms and seeing how significant the devaluation of this one is from that perspective.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that we take a multiplicative factor of sixty, in effect nullifying the damage (בטל בששים)! This needs explanation.
The Nimukei Yosef rounds up these two issues, saying that we paskin like the first version where they did like Rav Nachman said, and the way we determine the damage is by taking sixty similar date palms and seeing how significant the devaluation of this one is from that perspective.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that we take a multiplicative factor of sixty, in effect nullifying the damage (בטל בששים)! This needs explanation.
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
BK 58 - Preventing damage
The classic case of preventing damage (מבריח ארי) is where Reuven sees a lion headed toward Shimon's flock. Reuven chases away the lion to prevent the damage it would cause to Shimon. There is no monetary value to this action of Reuven, despite the fact that he has saved Shimon a tremendous amount.
The case under discussion in our gemara is where Reuven has a field that Shimon's animal accidentally trespasses upon. The field is quite muddy, and Shimon's animal is in danger of being damaged in the mud. Reuven unwittingly helps out Shimon's animal when the animal tramples on some wheat stalks. While this trampling saves Shimon's animal from damage, it simultaneously causes the wheat stalks to be destroyed. There is a value in this case to the damage that Reuven has unwittingly prevented. Shimon must pay Reuven for this benefit.
The Gemara says that our case is different than the aforementioned one for two possible reasons. One is that in the former case, Reuven was fully aware that he was saving Shimon from damage, which is not so in our case. The second reason is that in the former case there was no loss of money when he chased away the lion, which is not so in our case, where the prevention of damage to the animal inflicted damage on the wheat stalks.
The first distinction needs explanation, because of what significance is it if the person is aware? Just because he knows he is saving the other person's property, would it be as if he is relinquishing his claim to monetary compensation? If we would say that the issue is that when he knows, so he accepts upon himself any damages, then what is the difference between the first and second answers? The gemara seems to indicate that they are independant (from the language אי נמי)!
A careful reading of Tosfos answers this question.
Tosfos explains that the first answer is assuming that מבריח ארי is only when the savior is aware he is preventing damage, and thus he implicitly relinquishes his claim to monetary compensation, even if he loses money on the way. In our case, however, he is not aware, and thus there is no implicit relinquishing of the compensatin for loss.
The second explanation of the Gemara assumes that when a person is not intentionally preventing damage, it would also be called מבריח ארי. Thus, Reuven would only be left without compensation in a case where there is no damage to himself. If he is unaware, and there is indeed damage, so there would be an obligation to pay the damage, as in the case of our gemara.
So it comes out that the two answers are simultaneously independent and interdependent; the main focus of the first answer is the aspect of awareness, and the main focus of the second answer is the damage, but both include the other factor as well, just in a different light.
The case under discussion in our gemara is where Reuven has a field that Shimon's animal accidentally trespasses upon. The field is quite muddy, and Shimon's animal is in danger of being damaged in the mud. Reuven unwittingly helps out Shimon's animal when the animal tramples on some wheat stalks. While this trampling saves Shimon's animal from damage, it simultaneously causes the wheat stalks to be destroyed. There is a value in this case to the damage that Reuven has unwittingly prevented. Shimon must pay Reuven for this benefit.
The Gemara says that our case is different than the aforementioned one for two possible reasons. One is that in the former case, Reuven was fully aware that he was saving Shimon from damage, which is not so in our case. The second reason is that in the former case there was no loss of money when he chased away the lion, which is not so in our case, where the prevention of damage to the animal inflicted damage on the wheat stalks.
The first distinction needs explanation, because of what significance is it if the person is aware? Just because he knows he is saving the other person's property, would it be as if he is relinquishing his claim to monetary compensation? If we would say that the issue is that when he knows, so he accepts upon himself any damages, then what is the difference between the first and second answers? The gemara seems to indicate that they are independant (from the language אי נמי)!
A careful reading of Tosfos answers this question.
Tosfos explains that the first answer is assuming that מבריח ארי is only when the savior is aware he is preventing damage, and thus he implicitly relinquishes his claim to monetary compensation, even if he loses money on the way. In our case, however, he is not aware, and thus there is no implicit relinquishing of the compensatin for loss.
The second explanation of the Gemara assumes that when a person is not intentionally preventing damage, it would also be called מבריח ארי. Thus, Reuven would only be left without compensation in a case where there is no damage to himself. If he is unaware, and there is indeed damage, so there would be an obligation to pay the damage, as in the case of our gemara.
So it comes out that the two answers are simultaneously independent and interdependent; the main focus of the first answer is the aspect of awareness, and the main focus of the second answer is the damage, but both include the other factor as well, just in a different light.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
BK 57 - Returning an object without the owner's knowledge
The gemara says that in regards to a thief or a guardian who returns an object, there must be an awareness on the part of the owner that his object has been returned. If he does not know, then the responsibility remains upon the thief or guardian if anything occurs to the object before the owner is indeed aware of its return.
This is not true, says the gemara, in regards to a lost object that is being returned. As long as it is returned to the domain of its owner, the owner need not be aware of it. The gemara proves this from the passuk השב תשיבם - the double language of returning teaches that one must even return the object many times.
The question is, what does one thing have to do with the other? How do we see from the fact that I must return it many times that I have less of a responsibility and even if the owner is unaware that his object has been returned I am no longer held accountable if anything happens?
Perhaps it could be explained, לע"ד, that when the Torah says השב תשיבם - that there is an obligation to return a lost object even multiple times - it is basically saying that even if the person who lost his animal has been irresponsible and not properly watched it on more than one occasion, the person who finds it would still have to return it over and over again. This basically means that the Torah does not focus on the irresponsibility of the person who has lost the object - as far as the Torah is concerned he is not careful and we don't care! If you found it, you must still return it, despite the owner's carelessnes, even a hundred times!
From the Torah's view of the owner of the lost object, it is clear that his awareness of his object is not so significant in relationship to his responsibility for his own object. That being the case, there are two ramifications - 1. The one who finds it must return it multiple times, and 2. If it is returned to the (well-guarded) domain of its owner, he need not even be aware of it!
על דרך המוסר, what also comes out of this, is that if someone sees an object that is lost lying on the ground, even if one would tell himself that the owner will probably never claim it, one should still pick it up. The reason would be that even if the person doesn't claim it, the obligation of the Torah to return an object is clearly not focused on the person who lost the object - rather on the person who has found the object! This is evident from the obligation to return the object multiple times - despite the owner's negligence!
This is not true, says the gemara, in regards to a lost object that is being returned. As long as it is returned to the domain of its owner, the owner need not be aware of it. The gemara proves this from the passuk השב תשיבם - the double language of returning teaches that one must even return the object many times.
The question is, what does one thing have to do with the other? How do we see from the fact that I must return it many times that I have less of a responsibility and even if the owner is unaware that his object has been returned I am no longer held accountable if anything happens?
Perhaps it could be explained, לע"ד, that when the Torah says השב תשיבם - that there is an obligation to return a lost object even multiple times - it is basically saying that even if the person who lost his animal has been irresponsible and not properly watched it on more than one occasion, the person who finds it would still have to return it over and over again. This basically means that the Torah does not focus on the irresponsibility of the person who has lost the object - as far as the Torah is concerned he is not careful and we don't care! If you found it, you must still return it, despite the owner's carelessnes, even a hundred times!
From the Torah's view of the owner of the lost object, it is clear that his awareness of his object is not so significant in relationship to his responsibility for his own object. That being the case, there are two ramifications - 1. The one who finds it must return it multiple times, and 2. If it is returned to the (well-guarded) domain of its owner, he need not even be aware of it!
על דרך המוסר, what also comes out of this, is that if someone sees an object that is lost lying on the ground, even if one would tell himself that the owner will probably never claim it, one should still pick it up. The reason would be that even if the person doesn't claim it, the obligation of the Torah to return an object is clearly not focused on the person who lost the object - rather on the person who has found the object! This is evident from the obligation to return the object multiple times - despite the owner's negligence!
Monday, February 23, 2009
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Daf shiur: Baba Kama 55
Here is the Daf shiur from Shabbos's daf, Baba Kama 55.
Running time is exactly 22 minutes.
You can find older dapim on http://www.arigoldwag.com/dailydaf.html.
You can subscribe to the rss feed of the daf with the following: http://www.puresoulband.com/podcast/dailydaf.rss.
Running time is exactly 22 minutes.
You can find older dapim on http://www.arigoldwag.com/dailydaf.html.
You can subscribe to the rss feed of the daf with the following: http://www.puresoulband.com/podcast/dailydaf.rss.
Baba Kama 55: Amoraim don't know psukim?!
Why did Rebbe Chiya bar Abba imply that he doesn't know the psukim of the Aseres Hadibros? Could it be that an Amora didn't know whether it said the word ייטב in the Second Luchos?!
Check Tosfos in Baba Basra 113A (referenced by רע"א and the Mesoras Hashas) who says that indeed they didn't!
Check the Maharatz Chiyas who says that of course he knew the psukim, but since we find that the first and second Dibros were said at the same time (שמור וזכור בדיבור אחד), therefore he didn't know if we could really talk about one being first and one being second.
Check the Ben Yehoyada, who also talks about it.
I was thinking (לע"ד) that perhaps we could say that of course Rebbe Chiya knew the psukim, but he just wasn't sure if it was the type of extra word one could make a drasha from. דיקא נמי from the fact that he sends Rebbe Chanina to Rebbe Tanchum who was an expert in אגדה. He doesn't say go to an expert in מקרא, rather an expert in אגדה - someone who knows how to darshan!
Check also the Maharsha who clearly does not take the statement literally.
Check Tosfos in Baba Basra 113A (referenced by רע"א and the Mesoras Hashas) who says that indeed they didn't!
Check the Maharatz Chiyas who says that of course he knew the psukim, but since we find that the first and second Dibros were said at the same time (שמור וזכור בדיבור אחד), therefore he didn't know if we could really talk about one being first and one being second.
Check the Ben Yehoyada, who also talks about it.
I was thinking (לע"ד) that perhaps we could say that of course Rebbe Chiya knew the psukim, but he just wasn't sure if it was the type of extra word one could make a drasha from. דיקא נמי from the fact that he sends Rebbe Chanina to Rebbe Tanchum who was an expert in אגדה. He doesn't say go to an expert in מקרא, rather an expert in אגדה - someone who knows how to darshan!
Check also the Maharsha who clearly does not take the statement literally.
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