BK 92 - asking forgiveness

The Mishna says that one is not forgiven for the damage he has caused until he asks forgiveness from the one he caused damage to. This is proven from the passuk that states that Hashem commanded Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham.

The question is, we don't seem to see anywhere in the verse that Hashem is telling Avimelech to ask for forgiveness, nor does it say that he asked for Avraham to pardon him, so what's the proof?

ונ"ל בע"ה that Hashem tells Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham, and then says that Avraham will daven for Avimelech. The only way that Avraham would daven for him would be if Avraham feels positively toward him. Normally, when one causes an ill effect to his comrade, the compensation for the bad deed is not enough to placate him. Only once the person who has wronged his friend acknowledges his misdeed will the relationship return to its previous state. Thus the implication is that Avimelech is to get back on good terms with Avraham so they will be at the point where Avraham will daven for him.

This would also seem to be the understanding of the second passuk brought, where Avraham indeed davens for Avimelech. Here again we could ask how this proves that Avraham forgave Avimelech and therefore proves that one who has been damaged would also have an obligation to forgive the one who caused the damage? The answer be'H would be as we said, that from the fact that we see that Avraham davened, and he did so in such a way that indeed his tefilos were answered, this shows that he prayed in a fashion that was absolutely sincere and complete. This would only be possible if Avraham had completely forgiven Avimelech for his wrongdoing.

BK 88 - Brotherhood

The Mishna (87a) says that according to R' Yehuda, we do not apply the damage of embarrassment to a slave. The gemara explains that this is because the Torah uses the word "אחיו"- his brother, in reference to the one getting embarrassed.

Rashi explains that since a non-Jewish slave can not marry a Jew, he is not called your brother.

This would seem to indicate that one can only be called your brother if he can marry your sister and become your brother-in-law.

The mesoras hashas has a second explanation from Rashi, and that is that the non-Jewish slave doesn't have brotherhood at all, even with his own kin, as we find he would be able to marry his own sister or his brother's ex-wife.

Interestingly, the difference between the first and second understanding of Rashi is that in the first explanation, he doesn't have brotherhood with Jews. In the second explanation, he doesn't have brotherhood with anyone.

Something that needs explanation is that according to the second understanding of Rashi, that he doesn't have brotherhood at all, where is there an indication from the passuk that this is what brotherhood means? If anything, the verse says that the damage was caused in an altercation between "איש ואחיו" - a man and his brother. This would seem to imply that there is a brotherhood that is necessary (and missing by a slave) between the Jew who attacked and his 'brother' that was embarrassed. Where is the implication that the person attacked must intrinsically have 'brotherhood,' thus implying an exclusion of the slave, who has no brotherhood at all, even with his own kin?

It seems that according to the second understanding, we are not learning out from the relationship implied by "איש ואחיו" - a man and his brother, but rather, simply from the fact that the person who was attacked was referred to as a 'brother,' as opposed to, say, a 'fellow' (עמיתו) or another similar term.

It is also interesting that according to the mesoras hashas, this second understanding was the one Rashi preferred. Perhaps he preferred it because the Gemara, when stating the drasha, does not say, "to the exclusion of one who has no brotherhood with him (ie the one who attacked him)," but rather the Gemara says, "to the exclusion of one who has no brotherhood," without mentioning the one who attacked. This seems to be implying that he intrinsically has no brotherhood, even with his own sister and brother.

It is notable that Tosfos says, in explanation of Rashi's second understanding, that we are speaking about the slave's children, that they do not have brotherhood with their siblings. This is actually indicated from Rashi himself, when he says that the source for this idea that a slave would be permitted to marry his sister is from the verse that compares a slave to a donkey. This comparison teaches us that a slave's child is like a donkey, whose offspring may be mated with one another.

This is an important point, because this verse specifically applies to a slave, and not to a regular non-Jew, who, it would seem, would not be permitted to marry his sister. The slave himself would also be like a regular non-Jew, forbidden to marry his sister, as he was the product of a relationship between non-slaves. Only a child born of a slave would be considered like the child of a donkey and not related to his siblings.

BK 86 - payment for impermanent damage

The Gemara brings the argument between Rava and Abaye as to the obligation where one has caused an impermanent damage. Abaye says the damager pays 'sheves gedolah,' the value of the hand, and 'sheves ketana,' the loss of work as a cabbage patch guard. Rava says there is no payment for the hand, rather he is paid for his loss of work, but his work as a regular full-fledged worker.

I was wondering why according to Abaye one would have to pay for the hand if it is going to return to full usage later. I realized that the payment will be the difference between what he was worth before the damage, and what he would be worth now if he was sold as a slave. If he was currently sold, the person buying would be aware that his new slave's hand would be returning to full use soon, so the market value of the one damaged has not gone down as much as if he had lost the use of his hand completely.

It is also important to note that both according to Rava and Abaye, the value of the hand is being paid for, however, it is really just a question of how we look at the temporary devaluation - as נזק - the regular damage, and therefore we look at the slave value (Abaye); or as שבת - the loss of work, and therefore we look at his full loss of work (Rava).

BK 84 - midgets killing giants

It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the piece of R' Dustai ben Yehuda (on 83b), when we talk about different sizes (a small eye and a big eye), the Gemara says that if the one who knocked out the victim's eye had a smaller eye than his victim, we would lack a fulfillment of "an eye for an eye" if we would knock out the assailant's eye. Only when we speak of the possibility of one person paying (ie where the assailant's and the victim's eyes are different sizes) and another person having his eye knocked out (if their eyes are the same size) do we bring the passuk that has to do with "one law shall be for all."

When the Gemara later brings the contrasting cases of a midget killing a giant and a giant killing a midget, one would have expected the Gemara to bring the passuk of "a soul for a soul" which indicates that the person being killed must be the same size as the one he himself killed. Instead we bring the verse of "one law shall be for all."

There are two possible explanations that come to mind.

One is that the Gemara is assuming that you know the back and forth that was just stated, and it is almost like a חסורי מחסרא that you can add in, "if they are different size people than perhaps we would pay value in such a case. But then we would have the problem of 'one law shall be for all...'"

Another possibility is that the Gemara is trying to show that we are not focusing in on the thing that was superficially lost (the body or the eye), rather the function of that thing (life/sight). We could not bring the verse נפש תחת נפש - "a soul for a soul" because at this point we are coming to prove our point by exclusion, and that verse actually implies our point directly, that we focus not on the body, but rather the soul. This second explanation, however, could be easily refuted because the word נפש, while traditionally translated as 'soul' is really referring to the animal soul, and more directly indicates the body itself, not only its life force per se.

ונראה יותר כפשט הראשון

I think it also interesting to note that in the הוה אמינא of the Gemara we would have thought to say that we don't focus on the loss of vision (in the case of the eye) or the loss of life (in the case of murder), but rather on the eye itself or the body itself. Why would we think such a thing? I think that it is a very fair assumption because the Torah is מחדש that all you are paying is the actual value as a slave, not the intrinsic value of the eye or the life (which would seem to anyway be priceless). Thus perhaps we would think that we should be very 'superficial' as it were, and make a distinction between different size bodies and eyes. The חידוש is that we do not look at it so superficially, rather we look at the eye for its function, which is sight, and the body for its function, which is life.

BK 78 - Tana responding for an Amora?

The Gemara wants to understand where Rava's statement that "the word שה comes to exclude a crossbred animal" applies, and first says that his statement was made in regards to redeeming the donkey, whose holiness can not be transferred onto a crossbreed. The Gemara then asks that according to R' Elazar who says that one can use a crosbred animal for this function, where would Rava's statement apply? To this we say, "R' Elazar would answer that Rava would apply in a case of a Kosher animal giving birth to an unkosher animal."

Question is, why is R' Elazar, who is a Tana and predates Rava, forced to explain Rava? If anything, Rava should have to explain himself according to R' Elazar!

My guess would be that Rava was not saying this statement on his own, but rather, was quoting an ancient tradition that predated the Tannaim. The Gemara here itself seems to be assuming that indeed Rava's statement was powerful enough to warrant extensive discussion as to where it applies. The fact that R' Elazar has to reckon with Rava's statement strongly indicates that it was an old enough statement that R' Elazar too should have known of it, and therefore the Gemara has R' Elazar answering 'according to Rava.'

בכל מקרה, צריך עיון יותר ומקור לכזה פשט

Shiurim

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BK 76 - when did you slaughter?

The Gemara on 76B seems to be saying (in R' Elazar's question) that the slaughtering that creates an obligation to pay four or five times must be one that permits the animal to be eaten. If there is some other factor that is missing, for example the sprinkling of the blood (according to R' Yochanan) or the redemption of the animal (according to Resh Lakish), then the slaughtering has not permitted on its own and would not create an obligation to pay four or five times.

Question is, Why do we care if the slaughtering permits it to be eaten on its own?

נראה לי בס"ד that the reason the Torah obligates one to pay four or five times when he slaughters the animal or sells it is because he has done something to create a greater benefit for himself, what we might call מקרב הנאתה. When he slaughters it, he now benefits directly because he can actually eat it. Before he slaughtered it, he could not directly benefit. Similarly, when he sells the animal, he has gotten money for it, which he can now directly use for his own benefit.

With that introduction, the explanation of R' Elazar's implication becomes clear. If the slaughtering alone does not create the ability for the animal to be eaten, because another factor is missing (i.e. sprinkling or redeeming), then that act of slaughtering has not brought about a direct benefit to the thief. This in turn means that he would not be fined the extra two or three times because he is still missing the ability to be able to directly benefit from the animal he has slaughtered.

BK 76 - "Selling" to Hekdesh

The Gemara distinguishes between selling to a regular person and the donation one gives to the Temple of a sacrifice as follows. When one sells to a regular person, it is no longer referred to as the original owner's animal, rather the new owner's animal. However, in regards to a sacrifice, it is still referred to as the sacrifice of the original owner, despite the fact that it now belongs to the temple. Therefore, when one promises to bring an animal as a sacrifice, it is not considered that he has 'sold' it, and he will not have the obligation to pay four or five times.

The question is, who cares about the semantics? If the Torah requires one to pay four or five times if he has sold it, and that means that he has transferred it into another domain, what is the difference if it is still referred to as the original owner's animal? למעשה, it is now in the possession of the Temple!

It seems clear that we are not just dealing here with an issue of semantics, but rather, the very fact that it is referred to as the animal of this person shows that there is still a relationship between the person and the animal, despite his having donated it to the Temple.

The truth is that there is an ownership that he retains completely, despite his having donated this animal. That is, that he still retains the exclusive right to use this animal for the purposes of his own sacrifice. If, let's say, he has an obligation to bring a korban Olah, this animal is still his in regards to fulfilling his commitment, and no one else may use it. It is referred to as "Reuven's olah" (as per Rashi).

Thus, the character of one's transfer in regards to hekdesh is completely different from the character of one's transfer when one sells an item. Making an animal hekdesh just means that the owner will use it for a specific use which involves the Temple and the holiness that applies to the animal because of that. The animal is still connected to that person. Selling an animal to someone means that it completely leaves the ownership of the person who is selling it. Only then would the one who stole it have to pay the four or five times.

(Important to note, as Rashi mentioned, that despite the fact that it still belongs in a certain sense to the one who has donated it to the Temple, in another sense it has been transferred out of the domain of the original owner insofar as the slaughtering that the thief does is not considered as if it was done to the original owner's animal. It requires further thought to determine if the animal that the thief has donated is now called his sacrifice. The indication from the gemara is that indeed it would be called that.)

BK 75 - admitting to the fine

The Gemara says that Rav could even work out in R' Elazar B'r Shimon - despite the fact that ordinarily Rav holds that if one admits to the fine he won't have to pay it, where he's admitting because of the approaching witnesses, he will still have to pay the fine.

This needs explanation! Why should it matter what his motivation is? If the Torah says one is exempt when he admits, and as Rav says, this applies even where witnesses later arrive, what do we care why he's admitting?

In order to understand this, we need to think about why the Torah does not require one to pay a fine if he admits he has done the act that ordinarily requires payment for the fine. The simple understanding is that the Torah uses the fine as a teaching tool to help one realize the crookedness of his ways. The greater that evil act, the greater the fine - the greater this person needs to get a 'potch' to realize his mistake. Thus if he only steals, he only pays double. If he goes so far as to slaughter the animal or sell it, he must pay four or five times.

The reason the Torah says that if he admits to the act he's done he does not have to pay is because he has shown that he understands the mistake he has made. Thus, we no longer need to 'teach him a lesson.' (Parenthetically, this explanation works for Rav, but according to Shmuel, we will need to understand why if he has admitted, we will still give him the fine when witnesses come along without his knowledge.)

With this background, we can understand why Rav would concede that if he admits when he sees witnesses coming, he will still pay the fine. He is only exempt from the fine when we see he has learned the lesson and has admitted on his own. When he admits because the witnesses are coming, he is just trying to get out of having to pay the fine, not because he has learned his lesson! Thus we require him to pay, despite his admission, so his pocket will hurt and he will learn that crime does not pay.

BK 62 - Watching haystacks

What does Rashi mean (ד"ה חטין וחיפן בשעורים) when he says that when a person is supposed to protect a haystack, and it seems to be made of barley, that he will not watch it well?

One possiblity is that barley does not get burned as easily, thus it requires less carefullness.

Another possibility is that since the barley is not as significant, it does not give the same impetus to the one who is supposed to watch it to take care of it properly.

ונראה לי פשט שני

In either pshat, if he would have known there was wheat to be watched there, he would have taken better care not to create this destruction through his fire.