How do we understand the fact that the Torah only obligates us to return the lost object of a Jew?
Another place we have this question is in regard to the prohibition of taking interest on a loan, which is only forbidden when lending to a Jew, but not to a non-Jew. The question is, Why?
נראה לי בע"ה that the reason is as follows. (I believe the following is based on the Chofetz Chaim in Ahavas Chessed.) If we think about it, it really makes sense that one should charge interest to someone who is borrowing money. After all, they are receiving a benefit from my money, perhaps investing it in a lucrative business, while I sit at home without the money myself. There is certainly a monetary value to that, which I should be able to charge. Similarly, if someone loses an object, it should rightfully belong to the person who has found it, and not the one who lost it - as my 11th grade rebbe, Rav Yehoshua Kalish used to say, possession is ten-tenths of the law. If you have it, it's yours. If you lose it, it's gone!
The Torah, however, tells us a tremendous חידוש. This is that every Jew is considered your brother. A sibling identifies with his brother and would give him back an object he lost, despite the fact that he has every right to keep it. Similarly, a person who loves his brother would never charge him interest on a loan, but do it as a favor, completely altruistically. Hashem expects us to view every other Jew as our brother. This is a special relationship that Hashem desires to exist between the members of His chosen nation. These requirements are extra and beyond what is naturally called for. This is why they only apply to one's fellow Jew, and not to a non-Jew.
Friday, May 22, 2009
Sunday, May 17, 2009
BAM 21 - Figs, olives, and carob
The Gemara says that when a fig falls it gets disgusting, and therefore the owner will give up hope on it. However, the indication is that this would not be true in regards to olives and carob. What's the difference between them?
So, living in Eretz Yisrael, I am fortunate, בע"ה to have an olive tree in my backyard, and carob trees running along my street, so experience shows that olives and carob are both the types of fruit that are quite hard when they fall off the tree. That being the case, it is unlikely that they will get ruined when they fall. Figs, on the other hand, will fall off the tree when they are soft and ripe, and thus become easily ruined.
So, living in Eretz Yisrael, I am fortunate, בע"ה to have an olive tree in my backyard, and carob trees running along my street, so experience shows that olives and carob are both the types of fruit that are quite hard when they fall off the tree. That being the case, it is unlikely that they will get ruined when they fall. Figs, on the other hand, will fall off the tree when they are soft and ripe, and thus become easily ruined.
BAM 21 - What is Ye'ush?
Normally we think of Ye'ush as a person giving up hope on his object. This understanding leads us to a very significant problem. How can we have a "Ye'ush shelo mida'as" - a 'giving up hope' without knowing? If Ye'ush involves an active thought on the part of the owner of the object, we would have an oxymoron.
נראה לי בע"ה that Ye'ush actually means a dissociation between an owner and his object. But I believe there are two levels of dissociation. One is as regards the object itself (חפצא), and one is in regards to how the owner himself views the object (גברא). When we talk about the dissociation from the view of the object (so to speak), we refer to it as Ye'ush. When we talk about the disconnection from the view of the owner, we talk about his da'as.
When we have both factors together, the halacha is clear cut. If it has no sign, we have the dissociation from the object's 'perspective' (ye'ush). If we also have his awareness (da'as) that he has lost it, he gives up hope and the object completely leaves his possession. It would then be permitted to keep it. On the other hand, if it has a sign, it remains attached to him (no Ye'ush), and when he realizes he lost it, he does not give up hope (his da'as is to keep it), so it must be returned.
Ye'ush shelo mida'as is where we have one dissociating factor, from the perspective of the object - it is lost and has no sign. But the second dissociating factor, which is the owner's awareness of his loss, is missing.
According to Abaye, this object is not disconnected completely from its owner, and therefore it would be forbidden to take it. According to Rava, the fact that we know he will dissociate from it as soon as he finds out gives us the liberty to say that there is already a complete disconnection even now, since we already have a disconnection from the perspective of the object itself.
נראה לי בע"ה that Ye'ush actually means a dissociation between an owner and his object. But I believe there are two levels of dissociation. One is as regards the object itself (חפצא), and one is in regards to how the owner himself views the object (גברא). When we talk about the dissociation from the view of the object (so to speak), we refer to it as Ye'ush. When we talk about the disconnection from the view of the owner, we talk about his da'as.
When we have both factors together, the halacha is clear cut. If it has no sign, we have the dissociation from the object's 'perspective' (ye'ush). If we also have his awareness (da'as) that he has lost it, he gives up hope and the object completely leaves his possession. It would then be permitted to keep it. On the other hand, if it has a sign, it remains attached to him (no Ye'ush), and when he realizes he lost it, he does not give up hope (his da'as is to keep it), so it must be returned.
Ye'ush shelo mida'as is where we have one dissociating factor, from the perspective of the object - it is lost and has no sign. But the second dissociating factor, which is the owner's awareness of his loss, is missing.
According to Abaye, this object is not disconnected completely from its owner, and therefore it would be forbidden to take it. According to Rava, the fact that we know he will dissociate from it as soon as he finds out gives us the liberty to say that there is already a complete disconnection even now, since we already have a disconnection from the perspective of the object itself.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
BAM 19 - Life after death
The Gemara hides an incredibly deep concept in some seemingly simple words that we could easily gloss over and understand simply at the surface level. The Gemara states that a healthy person who wishes to give someone else a gift that should take effect after his death must say that it is transferred 'from today until after my death.' Only with this declaration is it considered similar to the regular statement of a deathly ill person. Such a sickly individual need only state that something should be given to another party and the gift takes effect fully after his death.
Hidden here is a great depth. The reason the deathly ill person need only make a simple statement, and it is transferred post mortem, is because there is intense power in his words. Why is there such power in his command? The answer lies in what the healthy person must say in order for his statement to take effect in a similar way. He must say, 'from today until after my death.' There is a recognition that is automatic for a deathly ill person that takes greater effort for the healthy individual. That is, that what I do now has an affect after my death! This is a natural understanding for someone who is deathly ill. This understanding is what gives power to his statement to take effect.
This is a tremendous lesson - the effect of our actions and words is increased manifold by our recognition of its effects on the world, at every level of reality - from the spiritual to the physical. Many times we do not realize the power of our words until it is too late. After 120, Hashem reveals it to us, as the Nefesh Hachaim explains the passuk מגיד לאדם מה שיחו - that Hashem reveals to a person the true effects of his speech; after his death.
For the deathly ill person, he sees it more and more clearly as he nears that final revelation. That is why his words have such power. A healthy person can also tap into that power if he recognizes the effect of his words - 'מהיום ולאחר מיתה' - 'from today until after my death.'
Hidden here is a great depth. The reason the deathly ill person need only make a simple statement, and it is transferred post mortem, is because there is intense power in his words. Why is there such power in his command? The answer lies in what the healthy person must say in order for his statement to take effect in a similar way. He must say, 'from today until after my death.' There is a recognition that is automatic for a deathly ill person that takes greater effort for the healthy individual. That is, that what I do now has an affect after my death! This is a natural understanding for someone who is deathly ill. This understanding is what gives power to his statement to take effect.
This is a tremendous lesson - the effect of our actions and words is increased manifold by our recognition of its effects on the world, at every level of reality - from the spiritual to the physical. Many times we do not realize the power of our words until it is too late. After 120, Hashem reveals it to us, as the Nefesh Hachaim explains the passuk מגיד לאדם מה שיחו - that Hashem reveals to a person the true effects of his speech; after his death.
For the deathly ill person, he sees it more and more clearly as he nears that final revelation. That is why his words have such power. A healthy person can also tap into that power if he recognizes the effect of his words - 'מהיום ולאחר מיתה' - 'from today until after my death.'
Sunday, May 3, 2009
BAM 8 - Acquiring together
Rami bar Chama draws an inference from the Mishna's statement that when two people pick up a lost object together, they both acquire it. From this we see that each one intended to acquire it not just for himself, but also for the other person who is picking it up with him.
The question is, what is the inference? Perhaps they are both picking up each half only for themselves, and they each acquire the part that they have picked up, by the power of their own act of acquisition?
נ"ל בע"ה that if they indeed had the intention to acquire the object only for themselves, that would mean that they were each only trying to acquire the entire object. Thus, being that they picked it up together, neither of them would have acquired it, because if two people try to completely acquire the same thing at the same time, their acts cancel each other out, and it remains ownerless.
Therefore, if we say that they have both acquired half of it, it must be that they were acquiring it in a way that each would have half. The intent of each is necessary on behalf of the other party, otherwise their selfish intent would block each other's acquisition attempt. Thus, we see that each one is helping the other acquire his half, and therefore Rami bar Chama proves that a person has the ability to acquire something for someone else.
This answer, however, requires further thought, because if it is correct, then it should not be necessary to have active thoughts to help the other party acquire, rather it should be enough for him to passively permit the other party to acquire his side.
On further thought, however, we already have seen that when they split up the object, it is not per se split based on exactly which side or which part is being held, but rather, it can be split in alternative ways (e.g. the talis with gold). Clearly, each person is helping the other party to acquire the garment in its entirety, albeit as a partner. This is the function that allows each party to request an alternate splitting up of the garment (or object).
It therefore becomes clear that each party is helping the other to acquire the entire object as a partner, and this can only be done through זכייה - actually acquiring it for the other party. This is Rami bar Chama's proof.
The question is, what is the inference? Perhaps they are both picking up each half only for themselves, and they each acquire the part that they have picked up, by the power of their own act of acquisition?
נ"ל בע"ה that if they indeed had the intention to acquire the object only for themselves, that would mean that they were each only trying to acquire the entire object. Thus, being that they picked it up together, neither of them would have acquired it, because if two people try to completely acquire the same thing at the same time, their acts cancel each other out, and it remains ownerless.
Therefore, if we say that they have both acquired half of it, it must be that they were acquiring it in a way that each would have half. The intent of each is necessary on behalf of the other party, otherwise their selfish intent would block each other's acquisition attempt. Thus, we see that each one is helping the other acquire his half, and therefore Rami bar Chama proves that a person has the ability to acquire something for someone else.
This answer, however, requires further thought, because if it is correct, then it should not be necessary to have active thoughts to help the other party acquire, rather it should be enough for him to passively permit the other party to acquire his side.
On further thought, however, we already have seen that when they split up the object, it is not per se split based on exactly which side or which part is being held, but rather, it can be split in alternative ways (e.g. the talis with gold). Clearly, each person is helping the other party to acquire the garment in its entirety, albeit as a partner. This is the function that allows each party to request an alternate splitting up of the garment (or object).
It therefore becomes clear that each party is helping the other to acquire the entire object as a partner, and this can only be done through זכייה - actually acquiring it for the other party. This is Rami bar Chama's proof.
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