BAM 2 - Seeing and acquiring

The Gemara begins with an assumption that the two cases of 'finding' and 'all mine' are one. Based on this, the Gemara learns that even though 'finding' could have the connotation of just seeing an object, the extra part of the case, 'all mine,' teaches that it is not enough to see an ownerless object for it to be considered yours, rather one must actually pick it up.

Then the Gemara rejects the notion that this is one case and says it is actually two separate cases, one referring to a lost object, and one referring to two people claiming they have bought something.

With this new understanding of the two cases as indeed being separate, do we lose the whole previous thought that taught us that seeing is not enough to acquire? In other words, will it now be enough to look at an object in order to acquire it, being that we don't have any extra case in the Mishna to teach us otherwise?

So I asked the local Rosh Kollel, R' Akiva Teichtal, who gives a daily daf shiur, and he said that they asked the same question in the shiur, and they came out as follows. It is clear that the Torah uses the word מצא - 'finding' to mean actually picking up. Thus, the Torah itself indicates that there is no acquisition until the object is picked up. At the first stage of the Gemara, all we were saying was that the mishna is coming to teach you this - so you don't make a mistake - and think that seeing it would be enough for it to be yours. Even without the mishna coming to tell us this, however, seeing would still not constitute an acquisition, thus when we no longer have the extra words from our mishna, we just don't have the indicator to correct our mistake; but seeing would still not create an acquisition in any event.

BK 96 - Old coins

The Gemara says that in regards to a case where someone stole a new coin, and it got old and turned black while in the posession of the thief, it is considered a significant change and the thief does not return the coin as is, but rather pays the original value of the coin when it was new.

The Gemara says that perhaps you would say that it is not a significant change, because it could be shined again and look new. To this the Gemara says, "מידע ידיע שיחמייהו" - Their age (or blackness) is known.

What does this mean?

בע"ה נ"ל לפרש that when you take an old blackened coin and shine it to look 'new,' no matter how much you shine it, it will still be obvious that this is not a new coin, but rather an old coin that was shined. That being the case, the value of a newly minted coin (in 'mint' condition) is higher than an old and dirty coin, and also higher than an old coin that has been shined to remove the effects of age. Thus, the 'age is known' - i.e. it is clear that it is still an old coin, despite the fact that it has been shined, and therefore one would have to pay the original value of what he stole and would not be able to give back the coin as is.

BK 92 - asking forgiveness

The Mishna says that one is not forgiven for the damage he has caused until he asks forgiveness from the one he caused damage to. This is proven from the passuk that states that Hashem commanded Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham.

The question is, we don't seem to see anywhere in the verse that Hashem is telling Avimelech to ask for forgiveness, nor does it say that he asked for Avraham to pardon him, so what's the proof?

ונ"ל בע"ה that Hashem tells Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham, and then says that Avraham will daven for Avimelech. The only way that Avraham would daven for him would be if Avraham feels positively toward him. Normally, when one causes an ill effect to his comrade, the compensation for the bad deed is not enough to placate him. Only once the person who has wronged his friend acknowledges his misdeed will the relationship return to its previous state. Thus the implication is that Avimelech is to get back on good terms with Avraham so they will be at the point where Avraham will daven for him.

This would also seem to be the understanding of the second passuk brought, where Avraham indeed davens for Avimelech. Here again we could ask how this proves that Avraham forgave Avimelech and therefore proves that one who has been damaged would also have an obligation to forgive the one who caused the damage? The answer be'H would be as we said, that from the fact that we see that Avraham davened, and he did so in such a way that indeed his tefilos were answered, this shows that he prayed in a fashion that was absolutely sincere and complete. This would only be possible if Avraham had completely forgiven Avimelech for his wrongdoing.

BK 88 - Brotherhood

The Mishna (87a) says that according to R' Yehuda, we do not apply the damage of embarrassment to a slave. The gemara explains that this is because the Torah uses the word "אחיו"- his brother, in reference to the one getting embarrassed.

Rashi explains that since a non-Jewish slave can not marry a Jew, he is not called your brother.

This would seem to indicate that one can only be called your brother if he can marry your sister and become your brother-in-law.

The mesoras hashas has a second explanation from Rashi, and that is that the non-Jewish slave doesn't have brotherhood at all, even with his own kin, as we find he would be able to marry his own sister or his brother's ex-wife.

Interestingly, the difference between the first and second understanding of Rashi is that in the first explanation, he doesn't have brotherhood with Jews. In the second explanation, he doesn't have brotherhood with anyone.

Something that needs explanation is that according to the second understanding of Rashi, that he doesn't have brotherhood at all, where is there an indication from the passuk that this is what brotherhood means? If anything, the verse says that the damage was caused in an altercation between "איש ואחיו" - a man and his brother. This would seem to imply that there is a brotherhood that is necessary (and missing by a slave) between the Jew who attacked and his 'brother' that was embarrassed. Where is the implication that the person attacked must intrinsically have 'brotherhood,' thus implying an exclusion of the slave, who has no brotherhood at all, even with his own kin?

It seems that according to the second understanding, we are not learning out from the relationship implied by "איש ואחיו" - a man and his brother, but rather, simply from the fact that the person who was attacked was referred to as a 'brother,' as opposed to, say, a 'fellow' (עמיתו) or another similar term.

It is also interesting that according to the mesoras hashas, this second understanding was the one Rashi preferred. Perhaps he preferred it because the Gemara, when stating the drasha, does not say, "to the exclusion of one who has no brotherhood with him (ie the one who attacked him)," but rather the Gemara says, "to the exclusion of one who has no brotherhood," without mentioning the one who attacked. This seems to be implying that he intrinsically has no brotherhood, even with his own sister and brother.

It is notable that Tosfos says, in explanation of Rashi's second understanding, that we are speaking about the slave's children, that they do not have brotherhood with their siblings. This is actually indicated from Rashi himself, when he says that the source for this idea that a slave would be permitted to marry his sister is from the verse that compares a slave to a donkey. This comparison teaches us that a slave's child is like a donkey, whose offspring may be mated with one another.

This is an important point, because this verse specifically applies to a slave, and not to a regular non-Jew, who, it would seem, would not be permitted to marry his sister. The slave himself would also be like a regular non-Jew, forbidden to marry his sister, as he was the product of a relationship between non-slaves. Only a child born of a slave would be considered like the child of a donkey and not related to his siblings.

BK 86 - payment for impermanent damage

The Gemara brings the argument between Rava and Abaye as to the obligation where one has caused an impermanent damage. Abaye says the damager pays 'sheves gedolah,' the value of the hand, and 'sheves ketana,' the loss of work as a cabbage patch guard. Rava says there is no payment for the hand, rather he is paid for his loss of work, but his work as a regular full-fledged worker.

I was wondering why according to Abaye one would have to pay for the hand if it is going to return to full usage later. I realized that the payment will be the difference between what he was worth before the damage, and what he would be worth now if he was sold as a slave. If he was currently sold, the person buying would be aware that his new slave's hand would be returning to full use soon, so the market value of the one damaged has not gone down as much as if he had lost the use of his hand completely.

It is also important to note that both according to Rava and Abaye, the value of the hand is being paid for, however, it is really just a question of how we look at the temporary devaluation - as נזק - the regular damage, and therefore we look at the slave value (Abaye); or as שבת - the loss of work, and therefore we look at his full loss of work (Rava).

BK 84 - midgets killing giants

It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the piece of R' Dustai ben Yehuda (on 83b), when we talk about different sizes (a small eye and a big eye), the Gemara says that if the one who knocked out the victim's eye had a smaller eye than his victim, we would lack a fulfillment of "an eye for an eye" if we would knock out the assailant's eye. Only when we speak of the possibility of one person paying (ie where the assailant's and the victim's eyes are different sizes) and another person having his eye knocked out (if their eyes are the same size) do we bring the passuk that has to do with "one law shall be for all."

When the Gemara later brings the contrasting cases of a midget killing a giant and a giant killing a midget, one would have expected the Gemara to bring the passuk of "a soul for a soul" which indicates that the person being killed must be the same size as the one he himself killed. Instead we bring the verse of "one law shall be for all."

There are two possible explanations that come to mind.

One is that the Gemara is assuming that you know the back and forth that was just stated, and it is almost like a חסורי מחסרא that you can add in, "if they are different size people than perhaps we would pay value in such a case. But then we would have the problem of 'one law shall be for all...'"

Another possibility is that the Gemara is trying to show that we are not focusing in on the thing that was superficially lost (the body or the eye), rather the function of that thing (life/sight). We could not bring the verse נפש תחת נפש - "a soul for a soul" because at this point we are coming to prove our point by exclusion, and that verse actually implies our point directly, that we focus not on the body, but rather the soul. This second explanation, however, could be easily refuted because the word נפש, while traditionally translated as 'soul' is really referring to the animal soul, and more directly indicates the body itself, not only its life force per se.

ונראה יותר כפשט הראשון

I think it also interesting to note that in the הוה אמינא of the Gemara we would have thought to say that we don't focus on the loss of vision (in the case of the eye) or the loss of life (in the case of murder), but rather on the eye itself or the body itself. Why would we think such a thing? I think that it is a very fair assumption because the Torah is מחדש that all you are paying is the actual value as a slave, not the intrinsic value of the eye or the life (which would seem to anyway be priceless). Thus perhaps we would think that we should be very 'superficial' as it were, and make a distinction between different size bodies and eyes. The חידוש is that we do not look at it so superficially, rather we look at the eye for its function, which is sight, and the body for its function, which is life.

BK 78 - Tana responding for an Amora?

The Gemara wants to understand where Rava's statement that "the word שה comes to exclude a crossbred animal" applies, and first says that his statement was made in regards to redeeming the donkey, whose holiness can not be transferred onto a crossbreed. The Gemara then asks that according to R' Elazar who says that one can use a crosbred animal for this function, where would Rava's statement apply? To this we say, "R' Elazar would answer that Rava would apply in a case of a Kosher animal giving birth to an unkosher animal."

Question is, why is R' Elazar, who is a Tana and predates Rava, forced to explain Rava? If anything, Rava should have to explain himself according to R' Elazar!

My guess would be that Rava was not saying this statement on his own, but rather, was quoting an ancient tradition that predated the Tannaim. The Gemara here itself seems to be assuming that indeed Rava's statement was powerful enough to warrant extensive discussion as to where it applies. The fact that R' Elazar has to reckon with Rava's statement strongly indicates that it was an old enough statement that R' Elazar too should have known of it, and therefore the Gemara has R' Elazar answering 'according to Rava.'

בכל מקרה, צריך עיון יותר ומקור לכזה פשט