BAM 21 - Figs, olives, and carob

The Gemara says that when a fig falls it gets disgusting, and therefore the owner will give up hope on it. However, the indication is that this would not be true in regards to olives and carob. What's the difference between them?

So, living in Eretz Yisrael, I am fortunate, בע"ה to have an olive tree in my backyard, and carob trees running along my street, so experience shows that olives and carob are both the types of fruit that are quite hard when they fall off the tree. That being the case, it is unlikely that they will get ruined when they fall. Figs, on the other hand, will fall off the tree when they are soft and ripe, and thus become easily ruined.

BAM 21 - What is Ye'ush?

Normally we think of Ye'ush as a person giving up hope on his object. This understanding leads us to a very significant problem. How can we have a "Ye'ush shelo mida'as" - a 'giving up hope' without knowing? If Ye'ush involves an active thought on the part of the owner of the object, we would have an oxymoron.

נראה לי בע"ה that Ye'ush actually means a dissociation between an owner and his object. But I believe there are two levels of dissociation. One is as regards the object itself (חפצא), and one is in regards to how the owner himself views the object (גברא). When we talk about the dissociation from the view of the object (so to speak), we refer to it as Ye'ush. When we talk about the disconnection from the view of the owner, we talk about his da'as.

When we have both factors together, the halacha is clear cut. If it has no sign, we have the dissociation from the object's 'perspective' (ye'ush). If we also have his awareness (da'as) that he has lost it, he gives up hope and the object completely leaves his possession. It would then be permitted to keep it. On the other hand, if it has a sign, it remains attached to him (no Ye'ush), and when he realizes he lost it, he does not give up hope (his da'as is to keep it), so it must be returned.

Ye'ush shelo mida'as is where we have one dissociating factor, from the perspective of the object - it is lost and has no sign. But the second dissociating factor, which is the owner's awareness of his loss, is missing.

According to Abaye, this object is not disconnected completely from its owner, and therefore it would be forbidden to take it. According to Rava, the fact that we know he will dissociate from it as soon as he finds out gives us the liberty to say that there is already a complete disconnection even now, since we already have a disconnection from the perspective of the object itself.

BAM 19 - Life after death

The Gemara hides an incredibly deep concept in some seemingly simple words that we could easily gloss over and understand simply at the surface level. The Gemara states that a healthy person who wishes to give someone else a gift that should take effect after his death must say that it is transferred 'from today until after my death.' Only with this declaration is it considered similar to the regular statement of a deathly ill person. Such a sickly individual need only state that something should be given to another party and the gift takes effect fully after his death.

Hidden here is a great depth. The reason the deathly ill person need only make a simple statement, and it is transferred post mortem, is because there is intense power in his words. Why is there such power in his command? The answer lies in what the healthy person must say in order for his statement to take effect in a similar way. He must say, 'from today until after my death.' There is a recognition that is automatic for a deathly ill person that takes greater effort for the healthy individual. That is, that what I do now has an affect after my death! This is a natural understanding for someone who is deathly ill. This understanding is what gives power to his statement to take effect.

This is a tremendous lesson - the effect of our actions and words is increased manifold by our recognition of its effects on the world, at every level of reality - from the spiritual to the physical. Many times we do not realize the power of our words until it is too late. After 120, Hashem reveals it to us, as the Nefesh Hachaim explains the passuk מגיד לאדם מה שיחו - that Hashem reveals to a person the true effects of his speech; after his death.

For the deathly ill person, he sees it more and more clearly as he nears that final revelation. That is why his words have such power. A healthy person can also tap into that power if he recognizes the effect of his words - 'מהיום ולאחר מיתה' - 'from today until after my death.'

BAM 8 - Acquiring together

Rami bar Chama draws an inference from the Mishna's statement that when two people pick up a lost object together, they both acquire it. From this we see that each one intended to acquire it not just for himself, but also for the other person who is picking it up with him.

The question is, what is the inference? Perhaps they are both picking up each half only for themselves, and they each acquire the part that they have picked up, by the power of their own act of acquisition?

נ"ל בע"ה that if they indeed had the intention to acquire the object only for themselves, that would mean that they were each only trying to acquire the entire object. Thus, being that they picked it up together, neither of them would have acquired it, because if two people try to completely acquire the same thing at the same time, their acts cancel each other out, and it remains ownerless.

Therefore, if we say that they have both acquired half of it, it must be that they were acquiring it in a way that each would have half. The intent of each is necessary on behalf of the other party, otherwise their selfish intent would block each other's acquisition attempt. Thus, we see that each one is helping the other acquire his half, and therefore Rami bar Chama proves that a person has the ability to acquire something for someone else.

This answer, however, requires further thought, because if it is correct, then it should not be necessary to have active thoughts to help the other party acquire, rather it should be enough for him to passively permit the other party to acquire his side.

On further thought, however, we already have seen that when they split up the object, it is not per se split based on exactly which side or which part is being held, but rather, it can be split in alternative ways (e.g. the talis with gold). Clearly, each person is helping the other party to acquire the garment in its entirety, albeit as a partner. This is the function that allows each party to request an alternate splitting up of the garment (or object).

It therefore becomes clear that each party is helping the other to acquire the entire object as a partner, and this can only be done through זכייה - actually acquiring it for the other party. This is Rami bar Chama's proof.

BAM 2 - Seeing and acquiring

The Gemara begins with an assumption that the two cases of 'finding' and 'all mine' are one. Based on this, the Gemara learns that even though 'finding' could have the connotation of just seeing an object, the extra part of the case, 'all mine,' teaches that it is not enough to see an ownerless object for it to be considered yours, rather one must actually pick it up.

Then the Gemara rejects the notion that this is one case and says it is actually two separate cases, one referring to a lost object, and one referring to two people claiming they have bought something.

With this new understanding of the two cases as indeed being separate, do we lose the whole previous thought that taught us that seeing is not enough to acquire? In other words, will it now be enough to look at an object in order to acquire it, being that we don't have any extra case in the Mishna to teach us otherwise?

So I asked the local Rosh Kollel, R' Akiva Teichtal, who gives a daily daf shiur, and he said that they asked the same question in the shiur, and they came out as follows. It is clear that the Torah uses the word מצא - 'finding' to mean actually picking up. Thus, the Torah itself indicates that there is no acquisition until the object is picked up. At the first stage of the Gemara, all we were saying was that the mishna is coming to teach you this - so you don't make a mistake - and think that seeing it would be enough for it to be yours. Even without the mishna coming to tell us this, however, seeing would still not constitute an acquisition, thus when we no longer have the extra words from our mishna, we just don't have the indicator to correct our mistake; but seeing would still not create an acquisition in any event.

BK 96 - Old coins

The Gemara says that in regards to a case where someone stole a new coin, and it got old and turned black while in the posession of the thief, it is considered a significant change and the thief does not return the coin as is, but rather pays the original value of the coin when it was new.

The Gemara says that perhaps you would say that it is not a significant change, because it could be shined again and look new. To this the Gemara says, "מידע ידיע שיחמייהו" - Their age (or blackness) is known.

What does this mean?

בע"ה נ"ל לפרש that when you take an old blackened coin and shine it to look 'new,' no matter how much you shine it, it will still be obvious that this is not a new coin, but rather an old coin that was shined. That being the case, the value of a newly minted coin (in 'mint' condition) is higher than an old and dirty coin, and also higher than an old coin that has been shined to remove the effects of age. Thus, the 'age is known' - i.e. it is clear that it is still an old coin, despite the fact that it has been shined, and therefore one would have to pay the original value of what he stole and would not be able to give back the coin as is.

BK 92 - asking forgiveness

The Mishna says that one is not forgiven for the damage he has caused until he asks forgiveness from the one he caused damage to. This is proven from the passuk that states that Hashem commanded Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham.

The question is, we don't seem to see anywhere in the verse that Hashem is telling Avimelech to ask for forgiveness, nor does it say that he asked for Avraham to pardon him, so what's the proof?

ונ"ל בע"ה that Hashem tells Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham, and then says that Avraham will daven for Avimelech. The only way that Avraham would daven for him would be if Avraham feels positively toward him. Normally, when one causes an ill effect to his comrade, the compensation for the bad deed is not enough to placate him. Only once the person who has wronged his friend acknowledges his misdeed will the relationship return to its previous state. Thus the implication is that Avimelech is to get back on good terms with Avraham so they will be at the point where Avraham will daven for him.

This would also seem to be the understanding of the second passuk brought, where Avraham indeed davens for Avimelech. Here again we could ask how this proves that Avraham forgave Avimelech and therefore proves that one who has been damaged would also have an obligation to forgive the one who caused the damage? The answer be'H would be as we said, that from the fact that we see that Avraham davened, and he did so in such a way that indeed his tefilos were answered, this shows that he prayed in a fashion that was absolutely sincere and complete. This would only be possible if Avraham had completely forgiven Avimelech for his wrongdoing.